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DR JOANNA DRAKE 
THE EXHAUSTION PRINCIPLE COMES IN 
THE WAY OF PARALLEL IMPORTERS 
Some comments on the Silhouette Judgment (delivered by the 
European Court of Justice on the 16 July 1998) 
1. The facts in the Silhouette case
An Austrian Court, seized with a dispute between two Austrian companies, 
Silhouette and Hartlauer, sought the assistance of the European Court of Jus­
tice in Luxembourg, through a preliminary reference. Silhouette, a manufac­
turer of top of the range branded spectacles sold its product to a company 
established in Bulgaria on condition that they would not be resold elsewhere, 
including the European Economic Area. Hartlauer, a discount outlet in Aus­
tria, sought to obtain Silhouette spectacles from the brand owner, but was 
turned down because of the down-market image of the outlet. On being re­
fused supply, Hartlauer succeeded in sourcing genuine Silhouette spectacles 
from Bulgaria on the grey market and imported them into Austria for resale 
from his discount outlet. In an effort to protect the image of the spectacles, 
Silhouette sought an injunction before the Austrian courts to stop Hartlauer 
from offering the spectacles for sale in Austria. 
Since the matter turned on the interpretation of a provision of the European 
TradeMark Directive, the Austrian Court referred a question to the European 
Court of Justice, in virtue of the preliminary reference procedure under Arti­
cle 177 of the EC Treaty. 
2. The points of law at issue
Silhouettes' claim was based specifically on Article 7(1) of the European Trade 
Mark Directive which lays down the so-called principle of exhaustion, that is, 
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a trade mark owner loses his right to prohibit the resale in the European Union 
of his branded goods as soon as he himself sells of consents to the sale of 
those goods anywhere in the European Economic Area territory. The EU ex­
haustion principle has been a firmly established principle in EU law regulat­
ing intellectual property rights and the Directive in question simply crystal­
lises this well-known doctrine. 
However, the set of circumstances before the Austrian judge required him to 
go beyond the state of evolution of the exhaustion principle as it stood then 
since it involved a country which was not within EEA territory, namely Bul­
garia. In other words, neither the Directive nor established case-law had a 
ready answer to the question of whether the trade mark owner exhausts his 
right to prohibit resale of his branded goods in the EU if he sells or consents to 
the sale of the goods in a country outside the EEA. Hence, the need for clari­
fication on whether the "international exhaustion" principle applied. This 
was the first point of law at issue. 
A second, though, supplementary point, related to whether Member States 
were precluded from adopting the wider rule of international exhaustion in 
their national legislation implementing the Community Directive. [Member 
States are required to implement the provisions of European Directives by 
enacting national legislation in order for them to be effective in their terri­
tory]. In the pre-Silhouette scenario there were at least, three ways in which 
Member States dealt with the situation. Denmark and the U.K. simply repro­
duced the language of the Directive about exhaustion in their national legisla­
tion leaving the national courts to interpret the wording. France and the Ben­
elux countries specifically outlawed the application of the international ex­
haustion principle. A third group of countries, including Sweden, the national 
law, which already provided for international exhaustion, was left intact by 
national legislation implementing the Directive. 
3. The judgment of the European Court of Justice
The Court settled these two points in the following manner: 
a) Regarding international exhaustion, it clarified that under the Directive,
exhaustion only occurs when the goods have been placed on the EEA market
by the trade mark owner or with his consent. Thus, where the goods are placed
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on the market in a country outside the EEA, exhaustion does not apply, so that 
the trade mark owner can legitimately stop the resale of the goods into the EU 
(provided that he has not consented to their being sold in the EEA). Interna­
tional exhaustion, therefore, did NOT apply in the EU. 
b) Regarding adoption of international exhaustion by the Member States in
their national legislation, the Court ruled that Member States were precluded
from adopting such a principle since the resulting discrepancies between the
Member States would create barriers to the free movement of goods and serv­
ices within the EU internal market. Therefore, all EU countries must now
apply only a Community exhaustion principle and Member States were re­
quired to adjust their legislation accordingly. The Court specified that the EU
would only be able to extend the exhaustion principle to products put on the
market outside the EEA through international reciprocal agreements. Mean­
while, the position is that brand owners are entitled to stop genuine branded
products from being imported into the EU from any country outside the EEA,
provided that neither the brand owner nor any licensee had consented to such
import.
4. Comments
This judgment has been the subject of controversy in the press and in aca­
demic writings. Most significantly, it provoked the wrath of large supermar­
kets and consumer associations in the U.K., which were in the middle of wag­
ing a "brand war" against the high prices charged for branded goods. By and 
large this judgment has been denounced as a step backwards in terms of con­
sumer rights as it severely limits the ability of grey importers to source con­
signments of branded goods from third countries ( outside the EEA area, nota­
bly the U.S.) without the consent of the relevant brand owners or licensees. 
To these comments, I would like to add a few observations about the Court's 
ruling. 
i. Confirmation that the doctrine of exhaustion has territorial limits
The Court judgment leaves no doubt as to the correct interpretation of Article 
7 of the Community Directive regulating trademarks, namely that as long as 
branded goods were put on the market outside the European Economic Area, 
12 Id-Dritt Law Journal VOL XXIV 
even if this was done with the consent of the owner of the mark or by third 
parties with his consent, there is no exhaustion of the trademark rights. In 
other words, a trademark owner ( of owner of a design, as in this case) may 
invoke his industrial property rights to prohibit the importation and sale of 
branded goods in the EEA if these goods were sourced outside EEA. 
The implication of these parameters may be appreciated if one contrasts this 
ruling with the situation obtaining INSIDE the external borders of the internal 
market. Here, parallel imports are fiercely protected and no rights deriving 
from intellectual property could come in the way of the free importation of 
trademarked or designer goods from other Member States even if these were 
obtained from third parties and not directly from the owner of the mark. All 
this is done in the name of guaranteeing so-called intra-brand competition 
( competition between goods of the same brand-name). In the internal market 
scenario where the overriding objective of competition is considered to be the 
market integration goal, the doctrine of exhaustion was the Court's response 
to the need of striking a balance between, on the one hand, discouraging the 
fragmentation of the single market along national borders through the use of 
national industrial property rights and on the other hand, guaranteeing rewards 
for innovation. 
In plainer language, intellectual property rights may not be successfully in­
voked to impede trade of goods originating in the Community, as long as the 
mark has been exhausted there, yet on the other hand they may be used to stop 
authentic goods sourced in third countries. Does this perhaps substantiate the 
view that the EU is a Fortress Europe? In other words, are intellectual prop­
erty rights being deployed as instruments in restraint of trade with third coun­
tries? It seems that the Union is keen on discriminating simply on the basis of 
origin and it is deploying intellectual property rights to achieve its objective. 
The irony in all this is that, in my opinion, it is Community industry itself 
which is being kept out in the cold! 
ii. Restriction of price competition in the European market on designer goods
In innumerable judgments of the Court of Justice and decisions of the 
European Commission in competition law cases, the importance of the guar­
anteed presence of price competition on the European market was empha­
sized. In fact selective distribution systems where luxury brand owners would 
attempt to secure price levels as well as an exclusive image for their brands, 
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would be slammed as illegal if it transpired that these networks were used to 
discriminate against and keep out price discounters. Some degree of price 
competition is crucial for effective competition in the relevant market. 
Again, this judgment seems to be imposing territorial limits to this European 
creed. This judgment has virtually eliminated the possibility of having ANY 
kind of price competition in designer brands in Europe since price discounters 
have now been discouraged to tap cheaper designer goods which are invari­
ably sourced outside the common market. The inferences could be two: 
a. Price competition in the internal market, according to the Court, is positive
only when this originates from within the Community (or EEA) - (This of
course is an aberration since you cannot have effective price competition if
you put territorial limits on where this should be coming from. Is this policy
conducive to the enhancement of consumer welfare, which should be the pri­
mary objective of competition law?)
b. The Court may be signaling that, rather than relying on low-priced grey
imports sourced from outside the Community to guarantee a degree of price
competition in the designer goods trade in the EU, manufacturers should in­
stead seek to loosen their stranglehold on retailers by allowing them more
freedom to set their own price levels. Hence an increase in price competition.
If this is a correct reading, this is not a bad proposition at all.
It is hoped that the latter observation is the correct one and that the Court of 
Justice will, in the near future, have the opportunity to develop this trend in its 
pronouncements. If, on the contrary, the former observation is true, then I 
fear that this judgment goes a long way in cushioning European industry from 
pressures of competition coming from outside its external borders. This is 
bad news both for the European consumer as well as for European industry. 
iii. Manufacturers' power over sales chain set to increase.
The expected aftermath of this judgment is that manufacturers or owners of 
brand names will tighten their control (thus restricting competition) over the 
price-setting and the location and methods of selling of their retailers. Moreo­
ver, this judgment should be analysed against the background of recent devel­
opments (Commission Communication on the application of EU competition 
rules to vertical restraints, published on 30 September 1998, IP 98/853) whereby 
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the Commission, in a radical review of its traditional policy on vertical re­
straints, has adopted a new approach. From now onwards exclusivity deals 
that fall below certain market thresholds are not deemed to be a threat to com­
petition and therefore are able to avoid the scrutiny of the Commission watch­
dog for competition, namely DG IV. These two developments have sent 
shivers down the spines of grey importers (typically large supermarkets) as 
they claim that the net effect will be the tightening of the manufacturers' pow­
ers over them. 
Should a distributor of a luxury branded product in a selective distribution 
network not be able to set his/her own price levels as long as the exclusive 
image of the brand name and its reputation are preserved? Should he/she not 
be able to source cheaper (authentic) versions of the goods in question from a 
third country if this in effect results in a better promotion of the goods with 
his/her customers who are willing to pay less for the good in question - per­
haps less than what other customers in other areas of the common market are 
prepared to pay? Is not this what diversity in the single market is all about? 
After all, it is an undeniable fact that not one single good is marked with the 
same price throughout the single market, as it has already become more evi­
dent for all thanks to improved price transparency throughout the EU follow­
ing the launch of the Euro on January 1st of this year. Effective competition is 
not about uniform pricing throughout the Community but it is all about setting 
the right price for the right market or part thereof. 
I fear that this judgment is lending support to the idea that price competition 
should be sacrificed on the altar of preserving the image of a designer good 
through the maintenance of high pricing. If this idea is allowed to run wild, 
consumer welfare will be seriously undermined. 
iv. What concept of competition is this judgment promoting?
This latter observation brings me to this broader issue. Is this judgment pro­
moting the objective of maximising consumer welfare through efficiency? Or 
is it perhaps giving more importance to the objective of market integration, in 
the sense that competition law is used as an instrument of consolidating the 
internal market as one unified whole by removing all internal barriers to trade 
but reinforcing the external borders? 
A restriction on price competition is definitely not promoting consumer wel-
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fare in the branded goods market. It is also doubtful how far this restriction 
may be justified as being necessary to safeguard innovation. In other words, 
what should prevail, the consumer's right to have real price competition no 
matter the origin of the goods or the innovator's right to protect his/her crea­
tion ? Surely this is a matter of proportionality - finding the right balance. Or 
perhaps this principle too has its territorial restrictions? 
5. A ray of hope?
There is one saving feature to this judgment: the Court has clearly left open 
the possibility of future negotiations with third countries with a view of ex­
tending the EU exhaustion principle to one of "international exhaustion". As 
is customary in all international trade negotiations, however, this develop­
ment will only take place on the basis of reciprocity - that is, only in so far as 
the third countries concerned are able and willing to offer the same openness 
in their home markets. A long and winding road is clearly ahead, if at all. 
